Accelerometer-based device fingerprinting for multi-factor mobile authentication by Van Goethem, Tom et al.
Accelerometer-based Device Fingerprinting for
Multi-factor Mobile Authentication
Tom Van Goethem, Wout Scheepers, Davy Preuveneers, and Wouter Joosen
iMinds-DistriNet-KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
wout.scheepers@student.kuleuven.be,
{tom.vangoethem, davy.preuveneers, wouter.joosen}@cs.kuleuven.be
Abstract. Due to the numerous data breaches, often resulting in the
disclosure of a substantial amount of user passwords, the classic authenti-
cation scheme where just a password is required to log in, has become in-
adequate. As a result, many popular web services now employ risk-based
authentication systems where various bits of information are requested in
order to determine the authenticity of the authentication request. In this
risk assessment process, values consisting of geo-location, IP address and
browser-fingerprint information, are typically used to detect anomalies
in comparison with the user’s regular behavior.
In this paper, we focus on risk-based authentication mechanisms in the
setting of mobile devices, which are known to fall short of providing re-
liable device-related information that can be used in the risk analysis
process. More specifically, we present a web-based and low-effort system
that leverages accelerometer data generated by a mobile device for the
purpose of device re-identification. Furthermore, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of these techniques and assess the viability of embedding such a
system as part of existing risk-based authentication processes.
1 Introduction
In September 2014, an attacker managed to access a privileged account on
Bugzilla, a bugtracker software used by Mozilla, by simply using the creden-
tials of the user that were leaked by a data breach on an unrelated website.
As a result, the adversary was able to access security-sensitive information on
flaws reported in the Firefox browser. By leveraging the obtained information,
the attacker eventually tried to exploit unwitting visitors of a news website.
This is just one of the many stories where an attacker managed to gain ac-
cess to a user’s account, and along with the tendency of users to either re-use
passwords between different websites or choose weak passwords [1], serves as a
good example that passwords are no longer fitting for strong authentication. As
a countermeasure to these threats, multi-factor authentication systems have re-
cently gained in popularity. These multi-factor authentication schemes require a
user to provide multiple elements that can be used to prove his identity. A pop-
ular choice is two-factor authentication, where a randomly generated passcode is
sent by SMS to the user’s mobile phone. By requiring such a token, it becomes
very challenging for an adversary to log in to a user’s account, as this would
require him to both know the password, as well as intercept the SMS message.
Although the additional factor substantially improves security, there exist
several drawbacks, mainly with regards to deployment and costs, that prevent
tokens over SMS from being widely adopted as a second factor in authentication
mechanisms. Multi-factor authentication, which can be seen either as an alter-
native solution, or as a complement to the two-factor authentication system,
attempts to tackle these drawbacks. In multi-factor authentication systems, var-
ious pieces of information on the authenticating agent are gathered during the
authentication process. This information, which can consist of the user’s IP ad-
dress, behavioral and contextual information, or a fingerprint of the browser he
is using to authenticate, is then compared against the user’s typical behavior. In
case some elements from this information deviate from what is expected, the user
is either denied access, or is required to use a stronger authentication method
for verification, e.g. by using the aforementioned two-factor authentication.
The strength of this type of multi-factor authentication system is strongly
dependent on the trustworthiness of the acquired information. While it has been
shown that fingerprint information gathered by a modern browser on a desktop
computer typically yields high entropy [2], the fingerprints obtained from mobile
devices carry a lot of similarity [3, 4], making them an unsuitable candidate in
a multi-factor authentication system. In this paper, we focus on improving the
reliability of multi-factor authentication in the web, and more specifically, on
mobile devices. We show how current authentication systems can be augmented
with a sensor-based fingerprint, in order to evaluate whether the authenticated
user is using a trusted device. By computing an adaptive similarity score, the
identity provider can determine the risk that the request is illicit, and take
the appropriate actions. We exemplify this type of authentication system by
developing a web-based system that leverages accelerometer data in combination
with controlling the mobile phone’s vibration motor. Finally, we evaluate a proof-
of-concept implementation on the usability and feasibility of deploying such a
system in real-world scenarios.
Our main contributions are:
– An accelerometer-based device fingerprinting mechanism with adaptive sim-
ilarity scores as a suitable candidate for multi-factor mobile authentication
– The integration of such a web-based multi-factor authentication solution in
a contemporary identity and access management (IAM) system
– A feasibility assessment of such a system in real-world scenarios
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we sketch a brief
background on fingerprinting and authentication. In Section 3, we motivate our
approach and describe the implementation of a proof-of-concept application. In
Section 4, we evaluate the application. In Section 5, we briefly reflect on related
work, and finally, we conclude our work in Section 6.
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2 Background
Fingerprinting browsers and devices has a variety of applications, both nefarious
as well as beneficial. The majority of use cases require the unique identification
of a specific user, whether it is used to prevent fraud, or to track a user over dif-
ferent sessions. This tracking is done by gathering information about the browser
and system that is being used. Examples include identification of the browser
version [2], canvas fingerprinting [5], and enumerating fonts and plugins that
are installed on the browser or system [6]. In most desktop environments, these
methods, or a combination thereof, provide a fingerprint that can uniquely iden-
tify a user. Consequently, it is not surprising that fingerprinting is a suitable
technique for multi-factor authentication systems.
However, for mobile devices, which often share the same hardware and do
not allow as many customizations of the system, device fingerprints of devices
that share the same brand often result in exactly the same identifier. More-
over, Spooren et al. found that the majority of fingerprinted properties are pre-
dictable [3], preventing these techniques from being used as part of authentica-
tion processes. In an attempt to overcome these shortcomings, researchers have
evaluated alternative approaches that can be leveraged to collect identifying
information.
Although mobile devices of the same type most likely share the same hard-
ware, certain sensors may suffer from microscopic imperfections caused during
the manufacturing process. Because the variations on the sensor data are most
likely unique for each device, they become an interesting target for fingerprint-
ing [7]. For example, Lukas et al. found that digital cameras expose a certain
pattern noise, which can then be used for identification [8]. Similarly, Das et al.
show that imperfections in device microphones and speakers induce anomalies
in the sound that is produced and recorded [9]. Again, the variations among
devices can be used for fingerprinting purposes.
Another interesting approach, is to analyze the data returned by a mobile de-
vice’s accelerometer. In their research, Dey et al. describe how imperfections in-
duced to accelerometer chips can be leveraged to create a unique fingerprint [10].
For the purpose of authentication in the context of the web, accelerometer data
is particularly interesting because this data is exposed by the majority of mobile
browsers, and does not require the user’s consent.
3 Approach and implementation
The sensor used for fingerprinting in this work is the accelerometer. An ac-
celerometer measures the acceleration force that is applied to the device along the
three physical axes. This acceleration is expressed in meter per second squared
(m/s2). The reasons for using this sensor is that (1) nowadays every smartphone
has an accelerometer, (2) accelerometer data is accessible through JavaScript in
a mobile browser and (3) there is recent work about using accelerometer data
for sensor fingerprinting [10].
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Fig. 1. Fingerprint phishing misuse scenario, enabling spoofing of the user agent.
3.1 Enduring the user agent and fingerprint spoofing threat
In contrast to prior work, where native APIs were used to obtain accelerometer
data for tracking purposes, our research focuses on leveraging the accelerome-
ter data, as exposed through browser APIs, for the purpose of improving the
reliability of a multi-factor authentication system. Since the collection of finger-
printing data is done purely on the side of the client, an additional concern to be
taken into consideration in our work is the mitigation against spoofing attacks
where an adversary poses as the legitimate user. Consider the misuse scenario in
Figure 1. Imagine an adversary who knows the credentials of a victim. He reads
the fingerprinting code and sets up a phishing site to steal a user’s device finger-
print. When prompted to log in, the adversary provides the stolen credentials
along with the fingerprint and is authenticated to the system. It is clear that
this scenario should not be possible, and thus a more clever approach is needed.
3.2 Mitigation against spoofing attacks
To counter the spoofing threat, our mitigation provides following mitigation.
Upon registration, several traces are collected, each consisting of multiple chunks.
A chunk contains a vibration part, i.e. a short period of time during which the
device’s vibration motor is enabled using the navigator.vibrate() API, and
a non-vibration part. The length (in ms) of the vibration parts will increase for
each chunk within a trace, as depicted in Figure 2. Upon registration, a trace
is collected from the user’s device and for each chunk, features are extracted.
The assumption made here is that each chunk will have a different vibration
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Fig. 2. A trace consisting of multiple chunks. Each chunk has a vibration part (in-
creasing length) and a non-vibration part (fixed length).
behavior due to the difference in vibration length, and is sufficiently robust and
distinguishable from other chunks.
When a user wants to log in, the user’s device is asked to provide sensor data
from chunks with random lengths. Upon receiving the sensor data for each re-
quested chunk, the IAM system extracts the same features and compares them to
the features from the corresponding chunk at registration. This approach makes
a spoofing attempt more difficult because either the attacker needs to obtain
sufficient information about a large amount of chunks, or trick the victim in
providing data for the requested chunks. We consider the former attack to be
unlikely, as this would require the attacker to collect accelerometer data during
a considerable amount of time, something that would easily alert the user of the
wrongdoing. Although the second attack, where the adversary just collects in-
formation on the requested chunks, may be viable under certain circumstances,
it should be noted that the proposed mechanism is not a stand-alone authen-
tication system. This means that an adversary not only needs to “forge” the
accelerometer-based fingerprint, he also needs to know the user’s credentials as
well as uncover the expected values for the other aspects that are required by
the multi-factor authentication system.
3.3 Sensor data collection and fingerprint extraction
For the collection of accelerometer data, we developed an HTML web application
using the jQuery Mobile framework1, collecting chunks as illustrated in Figure 2.
The chunks are numbered from 0 until N . The first chunk has a vibration part
of 400ms. For each subsequent chunk, the vibration part increases with 100ms.
The length of the non-vibration part remains fixed at 400ms. This length was
defined experimentally; 400ms without vibration is long enough for the device
to return to a motionless state. When this non-vibration length is less, it is hard
to distinguish between chunks because of noise the accelerometer still registers
due to the momentum of the device. This results in chunk 0 having a length
of 800ms, chunk 1 having a length of 900ms and so on. Chunk N has length
(400 + 100N)ms. In this paper, we only consider accelerometer data that was
1 https://jquerymobile.com/
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Fig. 3. Integrating accelerometer-based device fingerprinting in contemporary identity
and access management systems.
collected when the device was placed on a hard surface, e.g. a table top, because
we found it to result in more robust data, and is still viable in the context of
authentication. This also makes potential attack scenarios more difficult, since
this requires an adversary to either trick the user in placing his phone on a hard
surface until a sufficient amount of accelerometer data has been obtained, or
estimate the expected accelerometer values from the values that originate from
vibrating on an unknown surface. While not completely unfeasible, this approach
significantly constraints the viability and plausibility of attack scenarios.
The extraction of fingerprintable features is done in Matlab. After loading the
data, the timestamps are normalized. Next, for each datapoint, the Root Sum
Squared (RSS) is taken of the values on the three axes. According to the chunk-
stamps taken at collection, the trace is split into the corresponding chunks.
For each chunk, 8 time-domain features are extracted. These features are the
mean, standard deviation, average deviation, skewness, kurtosis, RMS amplitude,
minimum and maximum. These extracted features will be evaluated on their
robustness and distinguishability among devices.
3.4 Integration in identity and access management systems
We have integrated our solution in OpenAM 12, a contemporary identity and
access management system. OpenAM offers device fingerprinting and matching
capabilities using client-side and server-side JavaScript technology. As shown
in our previous work [3], the built-in fingerprinting code is not well suited for
mobile devices. In this work, we adapted the JavaScript code to call our ser-
vice to process accelerometer traces and chunks. The additional benefit of this
integration is that OpenAM and our solution can be independently scaled out.
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Category Benefit Prototype
Security Resilient-to-Physical Observation o
Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation o
Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing x
Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing o
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation x
Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-
Verifiers
x
Resilient-to-Phishing o
Resilient-to-Theft o
No-Trusted-Third-Party x
Requiring-Explicit-Consent x
Privacy Unlinkable x
Usability Memorywise-Effortless
Scalable-for-Users ?
Nothing-to-Carry o
Physically-Effortless
Easy-to-Learn x
Efficient-to-Use x
Infrequent-Errors x
Easy-Recovery-from-Loss x
Table 1. Summarizing table with the security, privacy and usability benefits. (x: offers
the benefit; o: almost offers the benefit; ? further investigation is needed)
4 Evaluation
4.1 Qualitative evaluation
The prototype is evaluated thoroughly based on the framework proposed by
Stajano et al. [11]. This framework provides an evaluation methodology and
benchmark for web authentication proposals. For evaluation purposes it makes
use of a taxonomy of 19 security, privacy and usability benefits. Table 1 shows a
summary of all evaluated benefits. From the 19 benefits, the prototype offers 10
benefits completely. There are 6 benefits that are almost offered by the prototype.
One benefit (scalable-for-users) could not be evaluated, and is left as future work.
4.2 Quantitative evaluation
Feature analysis For the design of the feature matching algorithm, the ex-
tracted features from the chunks are evaluated. All features are evaluated against
three criteria: (1) the distinguishability among chunks, (2) the distinguishability
among devices and (3) the robustness.
As we investigate whether the device’s sensor fingerprint can be used for
authentication, the features trivially have to be distinguishable among devices.
If this would not be the case, a fingerprint from any random device could be used
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to log in. The features also need to be robust, i.e. they cannot deviate too much
from each other when new data is collected from the same device. In case this
would not hold, the features would have little meaning, as their values deviate
too much for every feature extraction of raw data.
We analyzed the criteria above and depicted them in Figure 4. This figure
depicts 8 accelerometer-based features (mean, standard deviation, average de-
viation, skewness, Kurtosis, root mean square, minimum and maximum) on 3
different mobile devices. The length of each box plot represents the robustness
of a given feature on a particular device. This gives an idea of how consistently
the device produces the extracted features for different measurements. As the
robustness of the features is device dependent, this value can be used as a risk
measure for a device-specific adaptive scoring function. The distinguishability
corresponds to the extent to which the box plots overlap. The more they over-
lap, the more the values lie in the same range and are hereby harder to distinguish
from each other.
The most important conclusion of this analysis is that the short chunks con-
tain more entropy than the long chunks. This is mainly due to the exponential
behavior of the mean, skewness and RMS amplitude features. The minimum
feature is bad for distinguishing among chunks and devices and hereby useless.
Matching algorithm Now that the behavior of the features is known, it is
possible to design and implement a matching algorithm that checks whether a
login trace will be accepted or not.
Upon registration, a series of registration traces is collected. This number of
traces will be defined empirically in the next section. Using the data from the
multiple registration trace, we calculate an interval, which consists of a lower-
and upper-bound percentile of the observed values. During the login process,
a single trace, consisting of a randomized subset of chunks, is requested. For
each chunk in this login trace, all features are compared to those that were
extracted during the registration process. A certain feature, for a certain chunk
is marked as accepted when it falls within the boundaries of the registered values.
Subsequently, a score is computed for each chunk, which is based on the accepted
feature-values. Because the robustness of each feature is different, we attributed
each feature a certain weight, based on their distinguishability. The final score of
a specific chunk is determined as the sum of the weights of all accepted features.
When this sum exceeds a certain threshold, the chunk is marked as accepted.
For a successful authentication attempt, a ratio, which can be user-defined, of
all probed chunks should be classified as accepted. This ratio is directly related
to the difficulty of passing a login attempt: if this ratio is set to a high value, and
all chunks must match the values from the registration process, it becomes more
likely that an legitimate login trace will fail due to momentary measurement
inaccuracies. In our evaluation, we found that a ratio of 34 provides a balanced
end-result.
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Fig. 4. Distinguishability and robustness of 8 accelerometer-based features of different
mobiles devices (red: Motorola Moto G, green: Huawei P8 Lite, blue: Google Nexus
4). The length of each box plot is a measure for the device-specific robustness of the
feature.
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Fig. 5. Confusion matrices for all 15 devices. Left: chunks, right: traces.
4.3 Experiment setup
For conducting experiments, 10 registration traces consisting of 10 chunks were
gathered together with 3 login traces. The dataset consists of data from 15
devices: 6 Google Nexus 5’s, 3 Google Nexus 4’s, 3 OnePlus One’s, a Samsung
Galaxy S4 mini, a Samsung Galaxy S5 and an LG G3.
Performance metrics For measuring classification performance, each login
trace of the users device is checked by the matching algorithm. From this, the
amount of true positives TPi and false negatives FNi is calculated for each
chunk i. A true positive occurs when a chunk collected by the registered device
is accepted, i.e. a chunk that needed to be classified as accepted is accepted. A
false negative occurs when a chunk collected by the registered device is rejected,
i.e. a chunk that needed to be classified as accepted is rejected.
To investigate how the algorithm behaves for login traces from different de-
vices, three login traces are selected randomly. These traces will be referred to
as alien traces. The results of the alien traces are used to calculate the false
positives FPi and true negatives TNi for each chunk i. A false positive occurs
when a chunk collected from an alien trace is classified as accepted, i.e. a chunk
that needed to be classified as rejected is accepted. A true negative occurs when
a chunk collected from an alien trace is classified as rejected, i.e. a chunk that
needed to be classified as rejected is rejected.
To measure the performance of the matching algorithm (which acts as a
binary classifier), the true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) are
defined as follows (for each chunk i):
TPRi =
(TPi)
(TPi + FNi)
, FPRi =
(FPi)
(FPi + TNi)
These metrics can be plotted as an ROC-curve, where the FPR is shown on
the X-axis and the TPR on the Y-axis. It is obvious that in an authentication
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Fig. 6. ROC with the number of registration traces varying from 10 to 2. The threshold
factor t = 1
2
.
system, the focus should be on minimizing the false positive rate. A trace of
an alien device should not be marked as accepted by the matching algorithm.
Otherwise logging in would be possible from any device, making accelerometer-
based fingerprinting useless for authentication.
Results We investigate the performance of the matching algorithm on 10 reg-
istration traces and 10 probed chunks. The results are shown in a confusion
matrix in Figure 5. As there are 15 devices that test 6 traces, the results show
the classification of 900 chunks and 90 traces. For the chunk classification, the
TPR and FPR are 0.7444 and 0.0978 respectively. Hereby, the classification is
considered good, as the false positive rate is low. When the trace classification’s
TPR and FPR are calculated, they yield 0.8000 and 0.0222 respectively. The
true positive rate is even higher and the false positive rate lower, indicating a
good trace classification.
The false positives of the chunks can be considered insignificant, as they
almost all are filtered by the trace acceptance (which depends on the ratio pa-
rameter). Only one alien trace was classified as accepted. As the user still needs
to fill in a username and password, the classification algorithm is definitely suf-
ficient.
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Fig. 7. ROC with number of probed chunks varying from 10 to 1.
For each device, the number of registration traces is varied from 10 to 2.
The lower bound is 2 because this is the minimum amount of registration traces
needed to calculate the intervals used for matching. The intuition behind lower-
ing the amount of registration traces is that the calculated intervals will be less
accurate. This inaccuracy will probably result in more chunk rejections. There
will be more FPs and FNs as the number of registration traces is reduced.
The next experiment investigates what happens when the amount of regis-
tration traces is reduced. The amount of registration traces are varied from 10
to 2. The results in Figure 6 show the classification performance of the traces.
As can be seen, the true positive rate declines when we reduce the amount of
registration traces. This result confirms the intuition that the intervals used for
matching become less accurate when the number of registration traces decreases.
Notably, the false positive rate remains more or less constant. This means that
a reduction in registration traces only induces more false negatives, and no false
positives. In the results described above, the threshold factor t was set to 12 .
It is clear that there is a trade-off between usability and security. The more
registration traces are collected, the better matching and hereby the security.
But taking many registration traces impact the usability by imposing a longer
registration time.
Figure 7 shows what happens when the number of probed chunks decreases.
All classifications yield approximately the same results. The intervals stay as
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accurate as before because they stay the same. Because every chunk has a good
classification performance, every possible subset of chunks could be used for
logging in. This behavior is desirable, as it should be possible to collect any
subset for enforcing the spoofing mitigation approach. When a small subset of
chunks is probed, the probability of fingerprint phishing is lower because an
attacker his a harder time collecting the data of every possible chunk-probe.
Discussion We note that sensor fingerprinting through the browser is only pos-
sible because browser vendors implement APIs for collecting sensor data. The
purpose of this is to enrich the user’s experience, like automatically rotating the
display or using device motion in games. However, browser vendors could investi-
gate to which extent the induction of bias or noise is possible to mitigate privacy
concerns of tracking [12]. By doing this, they could distort device identification
through sensor fingerprinting. In that case, the authentication scheme presented
can not be used, and other authentication mechanism are needed. These meth-
ods could include the fingerprinting of user behavior, like for example capturing
a user’s search patterns or battery consumption.
Furthermore, since the security properties of the proposed mechanism are not
absolute, the proposed method should not be considered a standalone authenti-
cation mechanism, but rather part of a multi-factor authentication mechanism
where multiple features are used to determine the authenticity of an authenti-
cation request.
5 Related work
To counter the imminent threat of account compromise, multi-factor authenti-
cation is one of the most popular solutions. Motivated by their ubiquitousness,
the mobile devices of users are often leveraged in a multi-factor authentica-
tion setup. For instance, mobile devices can be trusted to compute a One Time
Password [13], or in authentication schemes, where they are used to scan a QR-
code [14], communicate over Near Field Communication (NFC) technology [15],
or emit and receive inaudible soundwaves [16]. Unfortunately, the majority of
these solutions can only be used when the user attempts to authenticate on his
desktop computer or laptop. Contrastingly, in this paper, we focus on improv-
ing the security of users who attempt to authenticate using just their mobile
device [17].
For this purpose, we leverage sensor data generated by the accelerometer
chip in the mobile device, which was found to be unique due to manufacturing
imprecisions [10, 7]. Prior research has evaluated using the accelerometer in the
context of authentication. In contrast to fingerprinting the imprecisions of the
accelerometer chip, Wang et al. leveraged the accelerometer data to analyze
a user’s gestures, and perform authentication on the basis of the uniqueness
of the gestures [18]. Similarly, Mayrhofer and Gellersen proposed a device-to-
device authentication mechanism where two devices are shaken together, and
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thus share very similar accelerometer data, in order to generate authenticated,
secret keys [19].
In the context of analyzing sensor data to uniquely identify devices, re-
searchers have evaluated various sensors for imperfections. Examples include
pattern noise exposed the camera [8, 20, 21], imperfections of a device’s acoustic
components [9, 22], or using the gyroscope to recognize speech [23]. We can fur-
ther generalize our solution by fusing behavioral information about how people
interact with the world, exploiting user specific traits about app usage, location,
stylometry, keystroke dynamics, phone calls, etc. [24–27].
6 Conclusion
In this work, our objective was to extend an authentication system where browser
fingerprinting is used as an additional authentication factor. The scope of the
system is limited to authentication with mobile devices, where security and pri-
vacy threats imposed by fingerprinting are taken into account. The contributions
of this paper are (1) the extension of a state-of-practice authentication system ar-
chitecture for fingerprinting, (2) a prototype implementation of this architecture
using accelerometer sensor data and (3) a critical assessment of this prototype.
The main conclusion is that sensor fingerprinting can be used for authenti-
cation. However, the quantitative evaluation has shown that there is a trade-off
between usability and security, depending on the amount of traces used for reg-
istration. The limitations of this work are the absence of a large scale sensor
fingerprint assessment, the focus on only one sensor for fingerprinting and the
use of a limited set of features for fingerprint extraction.
Future work could conduct a more extensive scalability assessment, with re-
gard to the uniqueness of sensor fingerprints and the performance of the system
on a large scale. As only the accelerometer sensor is used, it would also be inter-
esting to investigate to which extent other sensors such as speakers, microphones
and cameras can be fingerprinted for authentication purposes.
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